

STARVING FOR STABILITY:
THE LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN EGYPT, LIBYA, AND SYRIA

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STARVING FOR STABILITY:
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by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Middle East is highly factious, broken into countless sects, nations, and tribes creating a region of various beliefs, ideals, and cultures; therefore, these differences need to be reflected in U.S. foreign policy in this region. Most recently, the wave of Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 have further illuminated the presence and importance of the Middle East on a global scale, forcing the United States to reassess its relationship and presence in this region. An analysis of the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, illustrate that the conditions in each nation-state made them exceptionally prone to mass uprisings; the economic, political, and social conditions were key factors which promoted these revolutions, and it is necessary for the United States and the West to intervene in an appropriate manner which stimulates long term stability in the region.

*You can't make war in the Middle East without Egypt
and you can't make peace without Syria.
– Henry A. Kissinger*

INTRODUCTION

While state borders exist as a means of designating sovereign territory, the events which occur within them often are not isolated. In a globalized world, technology and media allow not only information to spread, but revolutionary movements. In January 2011, Tunisia experienced a nationwide revolt, and within months, a wave of revolutions spread throughout the region, including the states of Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While these revolutions equally promote a desire for change, the solutions to achieving this change vary; the United States has learned from past experience in the Middle East that a uniform policy, and reaction to these movements, in this region would result in failure. The economic, social, and political conditions within Egypt, Libya, and Syria prior to 2011 made them predisposed to mass revolutions; it is both recommended and likely that the United States and the West intervene in a manner which not only promotes long term stability in the Middles East, but long term stability, and security, at home.

Intellectual Importance

Through a comparative analysis, it is argued that the inadequate and poor conditions of the states united the revolutionaries, allowing the movements to form. Eric Hoffer's book, *The True Believer*¹ provides information on the factors which make uprisings possible, as well as explaining what is necessary for their success. While there are academics who have argued that a single approach to diplomacy must be utilized in Middle Eastern affairs, not only has the Arab

¹ Hoffer, Eric, *The True Believer* (New York: HarpersCollins Publishers, 1951).

Spring shown the limits and importance of American diplomatic power in the Middle East, but that these uprisings have proven that a singular approach cannot be successful in transitioning these countries into liberal democratic societies. Allen L. Keiswetter, a scholar at the Middle East Institute, contends that individualized policies need to be established, in order to be both “sensitive to local needs as well as attuned to US interests.”² The policies formed must be shaped according to the local culture and needs of these nations, as well as U.S. interests. There also remains a disagreement as to whether the United States should disengage its involvement in Middle Eastern affairs completely; however, based on the research and arguments made by leading academics in the field, including that of Andrew J. Tabler, a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute,³ action is necessary to U.S. international success. If the United States continues to delay intervention, it will increase the risk that not only turmoil will spread beyond the region, but the strength of the terrorist presence in this region will rise. Without creating a strong relationship with the rebels and revolutionaries in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the United States will be unable to assist in the stability and protection of human rights in a manner which reflects U.S. interests in the region. This dispute has been assessed by Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, authors of *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-revolution and the Making of a New Era*.⁴ United States action is likely to occur, and as the United States delays action,⁵ the potential danger to the revolutionaries and U.S. intervention success increases. Prior to the Iraq War, the United States was faced with two untenable options – seek its interests abroad by military engagement, or do nothing; however, intervention does not

² Keiswetter, Allen L. “The Arab Spring: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests.” *Middle East Institute*, (2012).

³ Tabler, Andrew J. “Annan’s Syria Action Group a Hopeful Sign.” *The Washington Institute Policy Analysis*, (2012).

⁴ Noueihed, Lin and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-revolution and the Making of a New Era* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

⁵ Achcar, Gilbert, *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprisings* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2013): 187.

only refer to military involvement, but economic and financial support as well. Based on the reasons which supported the Iraq War and previous academic research on the Arab Spring and intervention, the United States will likely reform its distribution of aid in Egypt and Libya, and engage in an intervention in Syria as quickly as possible.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT CONDITIONS

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation is often the root cause of mass movements. Past and present research has illustrated that the region of the Middle East and North Africa held the political, social, and economic conditions which make an area ripe for revolutionary movements; yet, the world was moderately unprepared. In 1968, Ted Gurr of Princeton University stated that relative deprivation is based on the perception of an individual or group, in which they believe that what is available to them in society does not match their personal capabilities or expectations. This most often occurs in areas which host high rates of education, high rates of unemployment, and little ability to participate in government affairs; there are few jobs available which match the individual's education level or expectations, and a lack of capacity to politically change this problem. Gurr states that this phenomenon directly relates to mass movements stating:

The basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form.⁶

The lack of opportunities available in a state which provides and requires an education intensifies resentment against the governing institution, making the nation highly susceptible to oppositional influence and mobilization.

Prior to the work of Gurr, in 1951, Eric Hoffer discussed the same phenomenon in his book *The True Believer*, which he asserts that mass movements are even more likely to occur in areas where the population is effected by high rates of "boredom," than in regions where the population is "exploited and oppressed." More importantly, when the people are educated,

⁶ Gurr, Ted, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." *The American Political Science Review*, 62, no. 4 (1968): 1104.

oppressed, exploited, bored, and, “are without abilities or opportunities for creative work or useful action, there is no telling to what desperate and fantastic shifts they may resort in order to give meaning and purpose to their lives.”⁷ When the masses are educated and live in a region which not only provides little opportunity for meaningful employment and is impacted by political corruption, the area becomes highly toxic and ready for revolt.

A population which fits the described condition also has a deeper awareness of, and sensitivity to political corruption, abuse, and excessive police power.⁸ An educated individual is able to read the laws, rather than simply hear them as stated by a biased government official, and he or she is also more knowledgeable about world issues, human rights, and international affairs. Also, one who is educated is less likely to adhere to and accept state abuse than one who is not. Providing someone with an education is similar to giving a blind man a set of eyes: the newly educated individual now has a heightened awareness of his surroundings and the intellectual capacity to understand what is truly going on around him or her, juxtaposed against the individual’s expectations. The educated are less likely to simply accept the injustices which they experience, just as a blind man would no longer accept the darkness he endured.

Popular Mass Mobilization

No revolution can succeed or sustain without a unifying agent which brings and holds the revolutionary masses together. Successful revolutions throughout history have shown that there must be an event, injustice, or pervasive situation which has become so problematic that the present state has become unbearable. This shared concern is what brings the people together and

⁷ Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 52.

⁸ Goldstone, Jack A., “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies.” *Foreign Affairs*, (2011): 3.

creates a manifested and shared desire for change.⁹ Unifying factors in history have included lack of individual freedoms, the disregarding of human rights, unjust taxation, and social as well as economic inequalities. No mass movement can fulfill its goal(s) unless there is a unifying element which serves as a catalyst to create a group which acts as a powerful agent for change.

History has shown that when rulers have an unsurmountable amount of wealth, they become disjointed from the population and often act as oppressors, rather than leaders. This can potentially unify a population, based on a mutual disdain towards a ruling body. This has previously been witnessed through the government of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran, and Porfirio Diaz of Mexico, who have shown that through the vast accumulation of wealth and high concentration of power, the population becomes, “depoliticized and unorganized.”¹⁰ In many areas which revolutions have occurred, the majority of the population is, and has been, unable to participate in government or policymaking, making it difficult for the population to organize as a singular body; thus for the movement’s success, the “we vs. them” dichotomy must exist.

When a group of people is unable to participate in government and has been ostracized from the institutions which governs them, they often seek political identification elsewhere. Humans desire a sense of belonging, and as Hoffer states, “we always look for allies when we hate.”¹¹ When citizens are both discontented and disconnected from the state, they cling to other citizens who share their feelings. As more citizens discover that a significant portion of the population shares in their angst, the “we vs. them” dichotomy is reinforced to provide a sense of belonging which the state was been unable to fulfill. This dichotomy draws a division between the opposition and the oppressors, thereby increasing unity within the group poised for a

⁹ Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 44.

¹⁰ Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011,” 9.

¹¹ Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 93.

revolution. A unifying agent that brings a group together allows for a revolution to not only begin, but gives it the ability to potentially succeed.

EGYPT

Poverty, Inequality, and Overeducation

Even before the global recession of 2008, Egypt had been experiencing economic hardship and decline, which contributed to the revolution and the end of President Hosni Mubarak's 30 year regime on February 11, 2011. Between 2004 and 2010, the country experienced over 3,000 labor protests, and while 40 percent of the population currently lives in poverty, this factor cannot stand as the sole attributor to the revolution alone.¹² While there are always who have greater wealth than others, the problem does not exist solely in whether the impoverished class exists; rather, it lies in the expanding income gap which separates the rich and the poor; structural inequality is deemed to be the leading cause of contemporary revolutions and uprisings.¹³ The wealth gap is problematic, as the richest ten percent of Egyptian households, mostly made up of government officials, earn approximately one-third of Egypt's total income.¹⁴ The gap between the rich and poor has grown exponentially, which proves critical when the lower-class consists primarily of young adults.

With high unemployment rates and two-thirds of the Arab population under the age of 30,¹⁵ Egypt's youth has been exiting secondary and post-secondary education into a society with few jobs available as, "each year 700,000 new graduates chase 200,000 new jobs."¹⁶ However, the major problem is not a lack of open positions, but a lack of *quality* jobs. Mohammad Pournik, Poverty Practice Leader at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Regional Centre

¹² Aoudé, Ibrahim G. "Egypt: Revolutionary Process and Global Capitalist Crisis." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2013): 247.

¹³ Nivin S. Abdel Meguid et al., "The Economic Causes of the Egyptian Revolution: 'January 25, 2011.'" *The American University in Cairo* (2011), 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵ Osman Salih, Kamal Eldin. "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 187.

¹⁶ Nivin, "The Economic Causes of the Egyptian Revolution," 11.

in Cairo describes this problem as “The real issue is the need for jobs with social dignity rather than jobs that come at the expense of dignity.”¹⁷ It has become a major social problem, when an individual with an elementary school education is ten times more likely to get a job than one with a college degree.¹⁸ The level of education the youth is acquiring does not adequately meet the types of jobs they are receiving, or that are available. As a result, many young, educated adults live in overcrowded slums in poor urban districts, even though 84.9% of the population is literate and 99% has at least received a primary school education according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.¹⁹ The economic conditions act as one of Egypt’s unifying agents providing a reason for mass movement mobilization; however, the unemployment rates alone cannot give purpose to the revolution, an analysis of Egypt’s condition shows the “we vs. them” dichotomy clearly existed.

Leadership Style

Between the years of 1979 and 2006 alone, the United States provided more than \$60 billion in economic and military aid in order to keep President Hosni Mubarak in power.²⁰ Initially, when President Mubarak was elected to his position in 1983, he positioned himself as a member of the National Democratic Party, believing in the liberation of Egyptian citizens while maintaining a relationship with the West. On February 4, 1982, Hosni Mubarak and his wife, Suzanne, met with President Ronald Reagan at the White House for a state dinner in Mubarak’s honor. However, regular elections were not held, allowing Mubarak to continue his reign as an

¹⁷ “Arab Nations Need New Policies to Tackle Unemployment, Slow Economic Growth – UN,” *United Nations News Centre*, February 5, 2013.

¹⁸ Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011,” 12.

¹⁹ “UIS Statistics in Brief - Egypt,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed December 10, 2013, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=2200.

²⁰ Azarva, Jeffrey, “Reneging on Reform: Egypt and Tunisia,” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, no. 2 (2007), 3.

authoritarian leader, often described as a dictator; President Mubarak proved to not only be undemocratic, but highly corrupt in his abuse of police powers and leadership.²¹

Although claiming to advocate democracy, Mubarak did not allow for a presidential election to occur until 2005. This was the first time during his reign in which the Egyptian people were allowed to voice their opinion and preference through the voting polls; however, Mubarak remained president, winning an election which was “marred by major irregularities, including vote buying, counting illegal votes, and manipulating public employees.”²² The Mubarak regime not only manipulated President Mubarak’s ability to maintain power, but had ensured that government positions were reserved only for those whom he had personally chosen. Mubarak was well known for giving these careers to relatives, friends, and constituents of his authority.

While the country has been in an impoverished state for decades, the Mubarak family has lived in wealth, obtained through the embezzlement of funds from government organizations, state accounts, and even non-profits controlled by Suzanne Mubarak. While over 40 percent of the country currently lives in poverty, government food subsidies have decreased, causing wheat prices to more than triple since 2007.²³ According to the UN, “the poorest families spend more than half of their average household budget on food and often buy less expensive, less nutritious food.” Since the financial, food, and fuel crises began between the years of 2007 and 2009, access to government programs and affordable food has greatly decreased, resulting in malnourishment rates of 31 percent in children under the age of five.²⁴ The problem is not simply and only that poverty exists, but that the rate of poverty increases as quickly as Mubarak’s financial accounts increase. This corruption divides the masses from the government; while the

²¹ Fahmy, Hazem. 2012. "An Initial Perspective on "The Winter of Discontent": The Root Causes of the Egyptian Revolution." *Social Research* 79, no. 2: 349.

²² “Hosni Mubarak,” *New Internationalist Magazine*, April 1, 2009, 421.

²³ Bush, Ray, “Food Riots: Poverty, Power and Protest.” *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 3 (2010): 124.

²⁴ “Hunger, Poverty Rates in Egypt up Sharply over Past Three Years –UN Report,” *United Nations News Centre*, May 21, 2013.

regime and Mubarak's constituents live in wealth, the majority of the population suffers with little opportunity to escape.

It has been estimated that the wealth of the Mubarak family ranges from \$2 billion to upwards of \$70 billion, with over \$340 million stored in recently discovered Swiss bank accounts. Even as Hosni Mubarak's trial continues in 2014, his healthcare continues to be paid for by the government, via citizen taxes and oil exports of Egypt, while his wife lives in a villa near Cairo, living off of his \$15,500 per month pension plan; in comparison, the average Egyptian employee, not considering those unemployed, earns only \$100 per month.²⁵ As previously discussed, there is a wide income distribution gap within Egypt's social structure, with the masses at the very bottom. This problem has been exacerbated for decades, and with little hope for peaceful government reform, it was only a matter of time before the anger of the population swelled to the formation of a revolution.

The Emergency Law

Instituted in 1958 under the leadership of Gamel Abdel Nasser, Egypt's Emergency Law, which consists of several articles within Egypt's constitution, has limited the political rights of Egyptians while extending the powers of the police and the state. Although President Mubarak promised to eliminate the Emergency Law during the 2005 election in an attempt to increase votes, he renewed the law in 2006, keeping it in effect for a minimum of two more years. The law and its extension played an important role in the uprising, as its corrupt and open-ended police powers placed extreme limitations on the basic human rights of its citizens. It allowed for any Egyptian to be detained without just cause and held in prison without a trial or charge for prolonged, even indefinite periods of time. It also allowed citizens to be tried in military courts,

²⁵ Hansen, Suzy, "Egypt's Mean Queen." *Newsweek* 159, no. 2/3 (2012).

and prevented citizens, particularly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, from running against him for office.²⁶ It also legalized the monitoring of private communications, and even deemed public gatherings illegal.²⁷ It has been estimated that since the Emergency Law has been in effect, hundreds of unjust arrests have been made each year under the law,²⁸ with the total estimate now in the thousands since 2011. Egyptian citizens have even reported that these types of arrests increased on the eve of the election, preventing supporters of the opposition from voting.

American Financial Assistance

Between 1948 and 2011, the United States government has provided over \$71.6 billion to Egypt, as well as an additional \$1.3 billion per year in military assistance, according to a Congressional Research Service report.²⁹ The aid that has been supplied since 2011, according to the United States government's foreign assistance report, has been earmarked with the intent of fostering a democracy, increasing counterterrorism forces, the expansion of civil liberties, and the establishment of a stable governing institution.³⁰ However, thus far the majority of the money has contributed to economic and educational development in the region according to the following graph from the Foreign Assistance website:

²⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood was the strongest opposition force to the Mubarak regime; however, President Mubarak did give them some positions in parliament in an attempt to contain their opposition.


²⁷ Brown, Nathan et al., "Egypt's Controversial Constitutional Amendments." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2007): 2.

²⁸ Reza, Sadiq. "Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt." *New Criminal Law Review* 10 (2007): 546.

²⁹ Sharp, Jeremy M., "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations." *Congressional Research Service* (2013): 9.

³⁰ "Egypt," Foreign Assistance, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?FromRGA=true&OUID=165&FY=2014&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent.

Category Disbursement Details, FY 2013
Egypt - All Agencies



As the causes of the Egyptian revolution included economic instability and institutional corruption, it is clear that the direction in which U.S. aid has taken is appropriate; however, the lack of funding directed toward establishing a stable democratic government has already proved problematic. After Mubarak was removed from his position in February 2011, Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected as president on June 30, 2012; however, by means of a military coup d'état, he was removed from power just one year later on July 3, 2013, based on accusations of violent suppression of his citizen opposition.

Democratic stability is as necessary to Egypt's success as economic strength. Within two years of Mubarak's removal from office, Egypt witnessed another proclaimed democratic leader turn dictatorial and oppressive. Unless more of the U.S. aid goes toward the establishment of a stable, constitutionally liberal democracy, it is unlikely that this revolution will be the last. While economic instability was a unifying agent which brought the masses together, if the "we vs. they" clash continues to exist after reformation, the state will always be at risk of a mass uprising. This distinction caused even wealthy physicians and lawyers, unaffected by Egypt's income disparities, to participate in the uprisings,³¹ illustrating the importance of this dichotomy, as even the wealthy were separated from the government. It is imperative to stability in the region that the people are truly capable of participating in political affairs, and unless this need is

³¹ Achar, *The People Want*, 152.

met, billions of dollars aimed at stabilizing the state may potentially be ineffective, preventing any U.S. interest (i.e. oil, human rights protections, etc.) which they may have in the region from being secure.

LIBYA

The Ill-Prepared

With Tunisia to the west, and Egypt to the east, the Libyan masses were significantly inspired by these previous Arab Spring revolutions. A combination of influence from neighboring revolutions, as well as its state of relative deprivation made this Middle Eastern state especially ripe for a mass uprising. Similar to Egypt, Libya has high rates of education within its youth population: according to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 99.9 percent of youth are literate, 99 percent of the appropriate-age population is enrolled in primary education, and 71 percent of the appropriate-age population is enrolled in secondary education.³² Although the country has boasted high education rates for several years, it is important to note that the type of education provided in the nation has been determined by Libyan dictator, Muammar al-Qaddafi. For example, ninth grade history books depict Qaddafi as a liberator of Libyan society, who freed Libya from the “dark ages.” The curriculum is based on *The Green Book*, a compilation of theories written by Qaddafi and published in 1975; the book rejects liberal democracy, capitalism, and Western ideals, and even demonizes any childcare which is performed by any other individual than the mother, thus discouraging females from seeking careers.³³ Even though the education system has provided more knowledge on Qaddafi’s ideology than on more traditional subjects – such as writing, science, and math – it educated the masses enough to become aware of the injustices which were rampant within Libyan society. Qaddafi was relatively unaware that he was metaphorically providing vision to the blind, giving

³² “UIS Statistics in Brief - Libya,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed December 10, 2013, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=4340.

³³ Gathafi, M. Al, *The Green Book* (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 2005): 70.

them the capacity to not only recognize corruption by offering an education, but the desire to destroy it.

Limited Economic Opportunity

In 2010 alone, \$41.9 billion worth of oil was exported out of a country with only 6.6 million inhabitants, yet Libya was known for high rates of poverty and unemployment.³⁴ Relative deprivation was a prominent condition which existed for decades in Libya, as the citizens were fairly educated, but lived in a land with few economic or employment opportunities; the people, regardless of their education were inaccessible to class mobility and unable to work toward attaining better living conditions. Estimations of the unemployment rate between 2009 to present are between 19 and 25 percent, with unemployment amongst the youth population as high as 30 percent. This proves to be problematic, especially when, in 2012, one-third of the population was under the age of 15.³⁵ Based on this estimate, 33 percent of the population will soon, if they have not already, be looking for work where none exists. With some of the highest unemployment rates in North Africa,³⁶ the youth population had become tired of the inability to find work, with little aspirations for the future. Relative deprivation has become a severe problem within Libyan society; this problem brought the angered masses together, unifying the masses years before the revolution actually began.

The Leader without Leadership

Muammar al-Qaddafi, Leader of the Free Officer's Movement, led a bloodless coup d'état against King Idris on September 1, 1969; through the coup d'état, he obtained power and

³⁴ Achar, *The People Want*, 165.

³⁵ "Libya," International Labour Organization, last modified November 07, 2012, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/cairo/countries/libya.htm>.

³⁶ Achar, *The People Want*, 167.

became the dictator of Libya. At this time, Qaddafi proclaimed Libya as an Arab Republic, and immediately instilled many reforms – such as the nationalization of foreign-owned banks and oil-fields – and enforced a strict, radical adherence to the Islamist faith nationwide. Like Mubarak, he initially proclaimed to be a true representative of the people, and desired a government which ruled through pure democracy (though one which did not use representation); However, Qaddafi’s 42 year-long regime was characterized by a mixture of socialism, nationalism, and Islamic radicalism, which he fulfilled by means of violence, bribery, power, and control of national income.

Throughout his reign, Qaddafi used oil profits to maintain power; he used the money to fund a powerful and suppressive military strength, sponsored chemical and nuclear weapons programs, and financially aided anti-Western terrorist organizations. In 1988, he was a benefactor of the bombing of a Pan Am Boeing 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland which killed 270 individuals, performed by a Palestinian-based terrorist group.³⁷ Qaddafi not only used his power and wealth to attack the West by supporting anti-Western terrorist groups, resulting in the murders of Western citizens, but he also used his own military organizations to execute his own people. For example, in June 1996, Qaddafi’s troops killed over 1,200 of his own people, according to Human Rights Watch (this later became known as the Abu Salim Prison Massacre.) Before the murders, many inmates had escaped, agreeing to go back to their cells peacefully if the prison officers agreed to tell the head of security that they wanted the living conditions to change. The officers reported the event, as well as the inmates’ request to the head of security, Abdullah Sanussi (who married to Qaddafi’s sister-in-law). The inmates were upset with the poor living conditions, as their families were not allowed to visit, clean clothes, medical care, or

³⁷ “Profile: Muammar Gaddafi,” *Aljazeera*, August 22, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2011/02/201122117565923629.html>.

outside recreation time; the majority of the inmates did not even receive a trial, and were kept in jail without having their cases heard before court.³⁸ After the complaints were received, the inmates were brought to the prison courtyard where police officers fired both bullets and grenades on the inmates. It was not until 2001, five years later, that authorities informed family members that the inmates were deceased; even then, they were not told how they were killed.

Qaddafi was not only well-known for his violent tactics and clear violations of human rights, but by his laws which drastically limited the freedoms of the Libyan people. As dictator, he not only ensured that access to basic consumer goods and medical care was limited, but he also installed laws which prohibited private ownership, retail trade, and freedom of speech.³⁹ While the average individual struggled to survive on a daily basis, the government and its kin networks had more than enough wealth for survival. The Qaddafi family lived in excessive wealth having “amassed more than \$200 billion in cash, gold and investment accounts around the world when Libyans were struggling for the money they needed for ... health care and basic infrastructures.”⁴⁰ Similar to Hosni Mubarak, Qaddafi had acquired excessive riches, leaving the rest of his country living in poverty and struggling to survive.

Within Libya, a clear “we vs. them” distinction emerged, as Qaddafi created a government controlled by close kin networks. Qaddafi’s system has been described as:

The most important security organization during Gaddafi’s reign was the “Leader’s Information Office” ... at the top of the hierarchy of intelligence and security services. Crowning all these apparatuses and armed units was a coterie made up of Gaddafi’s family and close friends as well as members of his tribe (the Qadhadhfa) and associated tribes (the Warfalla and Maqarha). The Revolutionary Guard Corps, which acted as the regime’s praetorian guard, was commanded by a cousin of Gaddafi. It comprises men

³⁸ “Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison,” *Human Rights Watch*, June 27, 2006, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/06/27/libya-june-1996-killings-abu-salim-prison>.

³⁹ Anderson, Lisa, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.” *Foreign Affairs* (2011): 5.

⁴⁰ Li, Mingcong, “Corruption, Transparency, and the Resource Curse.” *International Journal of Social Science and Humanity* 3, no. 6 (2013):573.

recruited from the Qadhadhfa in the region around Sirte, Gaddafi's hometown, which received preferential treatment under his regime.⁴¹

Qaddafi's security, intelligence, and most important government positions were held by those whom he trusted, such as relatives, friends, and members of the Qadhadhfa tribe. The majority of the population was unified by their impoverished conditions, but it was the regime which allowed them to aim their discontent toward a group. Placing blame on Qaddafi and his dictatorial system, the mobilization of the masses created two sides: Qaddafi's regime versus everyone else.

U.S. Financial Assistance

U.S. assistance in Libya has been dramatically less than what was appropriated in Egypt. While the United States government has committed to providing \$187 million in a assistance, only \$6.8 million has been spent thus far with approximately \$5.9 million to be spent in 2014⁴²; while U.S. intervention is necessary to the creation of regional stability, the assistance must be earmarked appropriately to promote success. According to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Department, the purpose of the aid provided to Libya has been described in the following statement:


U.S. assistance to Libya has focused on helping Libya transition to a peaceful and democratic state ... It is critical that U.S. Government support for Libya's nascent democratic institutions continue, both to bolster the country's transition to democracy and *to ensure the planners and perpetrators of the September attacks in Benghazi are brought to justice* [my italics]. The United States is committed to providing assistance that advances its two primary goals for Libya: first, supporting Libya's transition to a democratic country ... and second, *enhancing the Libyan government's capacity to bring to justice those responsible for the Benghazi attacks* [emphasis added].⁴³

⁴¹ Achar, *The People Want*, 166.

⁴² "Libya," Foreign Assistance, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?FY=2014&OUID=304&AgencyID=0&FromRGA=true&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent.

⁴³ "Libya," Foreign Assistance.

This mission statement clearly emphasizes the Benghazi terrorist attack in 2012 which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. citizens. The appropriation of funds in 2013 so far, provided by the information retrieved from the United States government foreign assistance website, clearly reflects this intent:



The majority of U.S. funds, as well as NATO's aid, via UN approval, have been expended on the supply of weapons, military training, counterterrorism training and efforts, air strikes, and border security.⁴⁴ This assistance was provided after the formation of the National Transitional Council on February 27, 2011, designed to create a unified anti-Qaddafi force,⁴⁵ as the oppositional forces may only be successful in overthrowing the regime if they are able to remain cohesive through outside financial support. Unfortunately, only a small portion has been appropriated to actually ensuring that a stable democratic state is established. Based on the funds distributed thus far and the government-issued statement of assistance, the aid has been directed toward strengthening the criminal justice system and military; however, it appears excessively focused on punishing the individuals involved in the controversial September 11, 2012 Benghazi attack.

Long-Term Stability

In February 2011, U.S. officials were seriously debating whether America should intervene by providing direct military aid; however, at the time it was noted that "Nowhere in the

⁴⁴ Bhardwaj, Maya. "Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War." *Washington University International Review* 1 (2012): 83.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

administration's public statements was there any assessment of U.S. interests in Libya that would justify American military intervention⁴⁶ – even though Qaddafi had been engaging in clear violations of human rights for decades. After the first Libyan demonstrations in Benghazi on February 17, 2011, Qaddafi had even publicly proclaimed “that he would track down and kill protesters ‘house to house.’” At this point, thousands of civilians had been killed,⁴⁷ yet the United States did not perceive any interest in aiding the Libyan citizens who had been denied their human rights, such as the right to life and basic protection.

From the foreign assistance data provided above, it is clear that the U.S. eventually did see interest in aiding Libya, but only *after* the attacks on the United States consulate and CIA annex in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. While the lack of democracy, protection of human rights, and a fair, as well as stable, government were major and influential factors of the revolution, only a small portion of financial assistance has been appropriated to these categories. As a nation which promotes human rights protection and universal freedom, the United States should have forecasted an immediate interest in Libya's affairs years before the revolution even took place.

It is clear that a democratic state cannot survive unless it is provided sufficient military protection; however, significant focus needs to be placed on the creation of a constitutionally liberal democratic state which protects the rights of its citizens. Having already witnessed a cyclical repeat in Egypt, the United States government must work towards preventing a similar relapse in Libya. If democratic institutional stability is not established in Libya, then the United States will have created not only a military which is more powerful, but one that is more capable of violently oppressing the population under the wrong leadership. Secondly, one of the major

⁴⁶ Indyk, Martin S. et al, *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012): 161.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

influences of the revolution was economic instability and lack of opportunity; as a result, a greater percentage of the funds should reflect this need, moving towards a more stable economy by ensuring there are more jobs available which meet education levels. The employment available must be meaningful and purposeful while providing a livable income. Without directing U.S. aid into the categories of democratic and economic development, the West will risk potentially creating an even more dangerous nation-state.

As a hegemonic superpower and promoter of human rights under The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States has an interest in providing aid, and this should have been recognized prior to the attacks in Benghazi. The violent oppression of the Libyans clearly violates human rights; however, Libya has been known for its excessively high rates of unemployment, and for years, much of the nation has lived in poverty while Qaddafi's regime did little to try to resolve this issue. Article 23, section one of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and *to protection against unemployment* [emphasis added]."⁴⁸ Even though Libya exports oil which nets billions of dollars each year in profit, the country continues to have high rates of unemployment, with no government programs initiated to compensate for the people's inability to find work. The people have been forced to endure in a society which suppresses human rights, while oppressing them both violently and economically. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure these basic rights do not continue to be violated.

⁴⁸ "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, accessed December 10, 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/#atop>.

SYRIA

The Friday of Dignity

In March 2011, Syria became the most recent Arab country to join the wave of Arab Spring uprisings. The initial incident which pushed Syria's revolution forward has been described in an article by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding:

Influenced by Arab Spring protesters on TV, in March 2011, children between the ages of nine and fifteen in Daraa wrote anti-regime graffiti on the walls of their school and were promptly apprehended by security forces. Upon release, their bodies and faces showed signs of severe torture; some had burns and others had had their fingernails pulled out.⁴⁹

This event, known as the "Friday of Dignity," caused the masses' discontent to develop into a popular revolt. Tensions and dissatisfaction had already increased as a result of the ongoing revolutions in other Arab nations; however, the Syrian population had not yet united in order to revolt. These children, who had written anti-regime propaganda iterated throughout the Tunisian revolution, were severely and violently punished not for the vandalism, but for the words wrote; this violent punishment as a catalyst which enraged and mobilized the majority of the Syrian population, as it illuminated the oppression which had been ongoing for years. As a result of this event, the Syrian revolution began.

The Religious Education

This event alone could not act as the sole unifying agent of the revolution; rather, there were multiple factors which indicated a revolution was on the horizon. Education in the Middle East has increased over the past decade, in not only Egypt and Libya, but Syria as well. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) statistics report that 95.3

⁴⁹Al-Saleh, Asaad, and Loren White. "Dissecting an Evolving Conflict: The Syrian Uprising and the Future of the Country." *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2013): 3.

percent of youth are literate, approximately 100 percent of children complete primary school, and 68 percent of appropriate-age citizens complete a secondary education. Over the past decade, government spending on education has even increased to 18.9% of its budget,⁵⁰ yet few Syrian students are able to enter or complete a university education because “rigid institutional structures and rules encourage Syrian students to focus on credential-seeking behavior and far less on developing knowledge and skills demanded by the labor market.”⁵¹ The Syrian education system is primarily religious based, focusing on teaching Islam through the Quran rather than focusing on subjects necessary for entering college and eventually attaining careers. This results in an ill-prepared Syrian youth, which, while they rigorously attend the schooling which the government provides, they are unable to use the education which they have received, not only because it fails to teach necessary skills and subjects, but because the economic conditions fail to provide employment opportunities.

The Relatively Deprived

Not unlike Egypt and Libya, the economic state of Syria proved to be a unifying condition for Assad’s opposition. Syria has a high youth population which has been and is currently exiting primary and secondary education into a society where jobs are scarce. Because Syria has an unemployment rate of 14.9 percent, it is apparent why the population has been discontent for years; however, the nascent revolution was not simply based on the unemployment rate of the whole population, but on the unemployment rate of the youth. For Syrians between the ages of 15 and 19, the unemployment rate is 39.3 percent, while the rate for citizens between

⁵⁰ “UIS Statistics in Brief - Syria,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed December 10, 2013, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=7600&BR_Region=40525.

⁵¹ Kabbani, Nader, and Siba Salloum. "Financing Higher Education in Syria." *Financing Higher Education in Arab Countries* (2010): 103.

the ages of 20 and 24 is 33.7 percent.⁵² Syria's unemployment rates are high; however, as was described previously, when a nation has a highly educated youth population, with few employment opportunities, relative deprivation serves as a factor which not only brings the masses together, but keeps them together.

As has been witnessed in most, if not all of the Arab Spring uprisings, the government does not share in the masses' suffering through economic hardship; rather, as the average Syrian income shrinks, the wages of government officials continue to grow. The regime of President Bashar has managed to become wealthy through oil exports; as a result, "the new wealth has essentially gone to the Assad clan and its associates, thus completing the patrimonial metamorphosis of power."⁵³ While the exact worth of President Bashar's personal wealth is unknown due to his ability to hide it in foreign accounts, estimations of his riches are in the billions. Oil is the major export of Syria, and the funds acquired through this commodity have increased the wealth of government officials, rather than used to increase government assistance programs. With all wealth and power in the hands of Assad's regime and his constituents, the Syrians see only one way to change this vicious system: by destroying and rebuilding it.

Leadership, Corruption, and Violence

Born on September 11, 1965, Bashar al-Assad had little intention of filling the role as successor to his father, President Hafez al-Assad. While studying medicine at the University of Damascus, Bashar's older brother, Bassel, was being groomed to take over the presidency after

⁵² Achar, *The People Want*, 177.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 175.

the death of Hafez; however, in 1994, Bassel was killed in an automobile accident, obliging Bashar al-Assad to fill the position in 2000.⁵⁴

On June 10, 2000, Hafez unexpectedly passed away; however, the minimum age for presidential candidates was 40, and with Bashar only 34 years old at the time, he was unable to run for president. In order to resolve this issue, parliament quickly decreased the age to 34 so that Bashar could contend. Ten days later, running unopposed, Bashar received 97 percent of the votes, and was elected for a seven year term; however, in 2014, he still is president without elections regularly held. As Eyal Zisser, professor of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University stated in 2003, "In the eyes of many Syrians, Bashar became president by default, given the absence of any alternative."⁵⁵ While the appearance of an election was held, for six years the nation had known Bashar would take office, regardless of his qualifications and lack thereof; the Syrians were simply left with no choice.

President Bashar is a member of the Alawi sect of Islam, and while this minority group only consists of 10 percent of the Syria's population, throughout the past decade, he has successfully alienated the Sunni Arab population, despite the fact that this group represents 70 percent of the population.⁵⁶ While Hafez was not the most democratic leader, he did implement government plans which provided employment and subsidies to much of the impoverished population. He was consistently able to exclude certain groups, particular the Kurds, from many programs; however, there was some government assistance available to them. Unfortunately, when President al-Assad came to power, he eradicated almost all of the programs meant to aid the working class; he decreased government employment, eliminated subsidy aid, and pushed a

⁵⁴ "Bashar al-Assad," *The Biography Channel website*, <http://www.biography.com/people/bashar-al-assad-20878575> (accessed Dec 11, 2013).

⁵⁵ Zisser, Eyal. "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?." *Middle East Quarterly* (2003).

⁵⁶ Achcar, *The People Want*, 172.

greater majority of the population into poverty. Between 2007 and 2011, Syria experienced a state-wide drought; with no government assistance, Syria has been forced to suffer through some of the highest poverty rates in decades, fueling mass resentment against the (mostly Alawi) governing elite.⁵⁷ Bashar has done little to compensate for Syria's declining condition; even worse, he was one of the major influences which caused it.

Although the general masses have unified through a mutual anger of poor living conditions, corruption, and high unemployment rates, they have been unsuccessful in overthrowing the present institution, as President Assad's regime utilizes a strategic system of spying on the masses, the army, and one another. Through the use of four intricate security and intelligence forces – Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, General Security, and Political Security – President Bashar has made it extremely difficult for the rebels to initiate any surprise attack. The government has proven to be difficult to dissolve, as the Assad family, over the years, has strategically taught their children the art of war as a means of successfully attaining military and police command (also aided by President Bashar's ability to put them in these positions).⁵⁸ In most powerful positions within Syria's politics, government, military, and educational system, the Assads have put in place direct family members, relatives, and well-trusted friends. It has also been estimated that as much as 80 percent of the positions within Syria's officer corps consists of loyal Alawis. By personally selecting the individuals who fill these roles, Assad had developed a "know all – see all" system which has allowed his regime to maintain endless strength throughout the revolution.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Achar, *The People Want*, 177.

⁵⁸ Landis, Joshua, "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013," *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 1 (2012).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 174.

Throughout the revolution and prior, Bashar's regime has used limitless violent and inhumane force on the Syrian population, ranging from the torturing of protesters, to mass murders and even public extermination through the use of chemical weapons. The chemical attack on August 21, 2013 killed over 1,400 Syrians according to a UN report, as well as hundreds of children.⁶⁰ This revolt has resulted in the deaths and murdering of countless innocent Syrians. While an exact number of rebel and civilian deaths so far cannot be accurately determined, the estimated number ranges between 70,000 and 100,000, as well as over two million civilians displaced from their homes. Unfortunately, President al-Assad's corrupt use of violence is not new to the region; however, due to the national attention the Arab Spring has attained, his inhumane and criminal acts are now under increased scrutiny.


U.S. Humanitarian Aid

Until recently, the United States has provided zero financial or military assistance to Syria; however, in 2013, \$109.9 million has been directed toward humanitarian assistance.⁶¹ The humanitarian assistance has been focused on providing food, supplies, and medical attention to over 4.5 million refugees displaced within Syria, as well as the 1.6 million refugees who have escaped to other countries, according to a June 2013 United Nations report.⁶² While both Egypt and Libya have received military and security aid, Syria has mostly received assistance to mitigate the physical damage endured by Syrian refugees, according to the U.S. Foreign Assistance website:

⁶⁰ "UN Report Confirms Chemical Weapons use in Syria," *NBC World News*, September 17, 2013, accessed December 09, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/16/20524937-un-report-confirms-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria.

⁶¹ "Syria," Foreign Assistance, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?FY=2014&OUID=272&AgencyID=0&FromRGA=true&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent.

⁶² Sharp, Jeremy M., and Christopher M. Blanchard. "Armed conflict in Syria: US and International response." Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, (2012): 1.



All aid has been directed toward only ameliorating the damage that has been caused, by providing basic supplies and medical aid to the refugees. In all other categories, including democratic stability, peace, and military aid, no aid has been provided as of spring 2014.

Redefining the Conflict

News headlines and government statements have repeatedly branded the Syrian conflict as a “civil war,” rather than as a revolution or revolt, which debatably affects U.S. public opinion. According to Reuters, a 2013 poll showed that of the Americans surveyed, 60 percent stated that the United States should not intervene in “Syria’s civil war,” while 9 percent believed the U.S. government should.⁶³ The media has labeled the conflict as a civil war, causing Americans to believe that this is not a revolution against a corrupt tyrannical regime, but a war between two equal parties isolated by its borders; this rhetoric plays a major role in preventing the United States and other Western nations from intervening.

What must be understood is the turmoil in Syria has occurred in the same manner as the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya; Syria’s fight for freedom has only expanded and lasted years longer due to a lack of stable intervention and a weak, ill-armed opposition. While Libya’s

⁶³ Wroughton, Lesley, “As Syria War Escalates, Americans Cool to U.S. intervention: Reuters/Ipsos Poll,” *Reuters*, accessed on December 7, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/25/us-syria-crisis-usa-poll-idUSBRE97O00E20130825>.

fight had also been defined as a civil war,⁶⁴ within the media and news it was most often labeled as a revolution, rather than a civil war, and U.S. financial and military aid was still provided. With minimal involvement by the West, this “civil war” has expanded beyond Syria’s borders, creating conflict throughout the entire region. By defining the battle as a civil war in American news headlines, it has framed the conflict as a fight between two remote parties, rather than as a struggle between the masses and an oppressive regime which, for decades, has repeatedly violated the masses’ human rights. The violent battle needs to be redefined in order to obtain U.S. public support.

To date, the battle between the opposition and Assad has been unevenly fought. The rebels are ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and, for the most part, untrained, whereas “the regime’s military superiority is being maintained by outside support – political support and arms from Russia; financial support, arms, and fighters from Iran and its regional allies,”⁶⁵ the weapons aid promised to the rebels by Qatar and Saudi Arabia has been unable to reach them, as Turkey and Jordan refuse to allow the transit through their borders.⁶⁶ The only aid that is actually being received by the rebels is from al-Qaeda, worsening the situation.⁶⁷

While the United States continues to proclaim that a national interest currently does not exist, the same humanitarian reasons which promoted U.S. intervention in Libya also are present in Syria. As a global promoter of human rights, the United States has every interest in aiding the opposition. While the United States cannot simply send troops to Syria, as it would potentially create another war similar, if not worse, to that of the Iraq War of 2003. If aid is not provided immediately to remove President Bashar’s regime and stabilize the state, then this war is likely to

⁶⁴ Bhardwaj, “Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria,” 81.

⁶⁵ Achar, *The People Want*, 186.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁶⁷ Wroughton, “As Syria War Escalates.”

spread throughout the Middle East, just as the Tunisian revolt spread a wave of uprisings. No event such as this can ever be contained, and for it to continue puts the entire region at risk. While peaceful diplomatic Western action has been implemented, such as the ban of importing Syrian oil into the European Union, and the United States breaking all ties with Syrian based businesses, it is argued that this simply is not enough.⁶⁸ Action from the West is necessary to stability, which is of U.S. national interest.

Each day the West stands idly by as the violence in Syria continues, more innocent lives are lost or displaced. As a nation, the United States has remained idle for too long, exhausting the ability to gain the trust of the rebels and ensure long-term stability in a manner which would reflect U.S. interest. Without immediate intervention, this turmoil will likely spread; therefore, when the United States does choose to intervene, it will be even more costly:

They [the West] thus intensify the potential danger that these fundamentalist Sunni groups represent for the Syrian uprising as well as for the country's future in general. From this point of view as well, the sooner the Syrian regime topples, the better. The longer it lasts, the greater is the risk that the country will plunge into barbarism.

The rebels are presently aided by al-Qaeda, yet, at this point they are still ill-equipped to win this war; aid is needed, and if the West does not step in, the United States risks losing this entire nation to terrorist groups and chaos.

⁶⁸ Indyk, Martin S. et al, *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012): 178.

ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS

To enforce pressure for the establishment of democracy in a state which does not desire it would debase state sovereignty and cause global backlash; however, to not aid those which not only desire democracy, but need it, will prove consequential. While the focus of U.S. foreign policy wavers over time, its basic interests remain the same: domestic security, protection of human rights, the spread of democracy, and stability. Despite the distance between the United States and the Middle East, without immediate and appropriate intervention in the region, the United States will be unable to promote and protect its long-term interests.

While the United States has already implemented a plan to aid Egypt, if a greater percentage is not earmarked for democratic stability and physical security, then only one cause of the problem will be solved. Democracy and capitalism are separate entities, and while the two tend to coexist together in several states, there is no exact evidence which supports this argument. Without establishing a democratic society in Egypt, then the United States will only be making the state more economically powerful without a liberal democratic government to provide protection from corruption and misuse of this power.

As American lives were lost in the Benghazi attacks, it is imperative to U.S. interests to bring the men held accountable to justice; however, without the direction of Western attention and support to economic development, democracy, human rights, and a stable government, then this revolution in Libya will not be the last. The dictatorial style of government was the center of Libya's crisis, and only through the appropriation of funds to the establishing of a just institution can the West hope to prevent future corruption. Libya has potential for success; while the removal of Qaddafi was the first step to achieving it, the West is likely to prepare for the many

steps and years of work ahead. It is possible that it will be remembered that Libya's previous government was highly anti-Western oriented, and it is in the interest of the United States to ensure this does not rise again.

While the United States does not note an immediate importance in aiding Syria, this is not to say its interests are not at stake. Thus far, all money has been directed toward post-conflict humanitarian assistance, which, while it reduces the injury felt by the Syrian citizens who have been displaced, this aid does not prevent future damage. Unless assistance is provided which aids in the dissolving of President Assad's regime, instills democracy, protects human rights, and promotes economic stability (even though this will take years, possibly decades, of effort), then this state conflict will only continue to spread into a regional, possibly global conflict. While the Middle East may seem so distantly far from U.S. borders, if this fight is not contained in the immediate future, it will increase the risk of the United States fighting it later, on a grander, more costly scale.

Hegemonic stability theory states that, on a global scale, humans are better off with a single powerful nation-state, one that can promote enforceable global order as a means of attaining worldwide stability. For decades the United States has been a powerful hegemon, making American intervention necessary in the Middle East, as its assistance will promote regional, therefore, global stability. Only through concentrated intervention may the United States and the West not only do what is right, but fulfill what is in their interest to do. Through calculated intervention methods, the West will not only secure the borders of Egypt, Libya, and Syria, but those of the United States. This conflict will not stay contained for long, and to prevent the spillover effect, and from spreading to U.S. soil, a calculated and effective Western

intervention must occur which does not produce short-term solutions, but the long-term stability that the Middle East and North Africa continues to starve for.

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